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Abstract 
     R&D collaboration facilitates pooling of complementary skills, learning 
from the partner as well as sharing risks and costs. Research therefore 
repeatedly stressed the positive relationship between collaborative R&D and 
innovation performance. Collaboration, however, involves transaction costs in 
form of coordination and monitoring efforts and requires knowledge 
disclosure. This study explicitly considers a firm’s collaboration intensity, that 
is, the share of collaborative R&D projects in a firms’ total R&D projects in a 
sample of mostly small and medium-sized firms (SMEs). We can confirm 
previous findings in terms of gains for innovation performance, but also show 
that collaboration has decreasing and even negative returns on product 
innovation if its intensity increases above a certain threshold. In particular, 
costs start outweighing benefits if a firm pursues more than about two thirds of 
its R&D projects in collaboration.  
 
 
Keywords: Innovation performance, product innovation, R&D partnerships, 
collaboration intensity, SMEs, transaction costs, selection model, 
endogenous switching   
 
JEL-Classification: O31, O32, O33, O34 
 
  
Authors’ contact details:  
Hanna Hottenrott, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich Heine University 
Düsseldorf, Universitätsstrasse 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany;  hottenrott@dice.hhu.de.  
Cindy Lopes-Bento, K.U.Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation, 
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium. cindy.lopesbento@kuleuven.be.  
 
Acknowledgements: Lopes-Bento gratefully acknowledges financial support by the National Research 
Fund, Luxembourg, co-funded under the Marie Curie Actions of the European Commission (FP7-
COFUND). 
  
  
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on R&D partnerships repeatedly stressed the virtues of collaborative innovation. 
Pooling of complementary competencies, skill sourcing, and learning from the partner are all 
means through which partnering firms gain (Shan et al 1994; Hagedoorn 1993; Powell et al. 
1996; Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006; Zidorn and Wagner 2013). A large number of studies 
identified positive effects on innovation performance suggesting that the potential gains 
through collaborative innovation projects are high (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Van 
Ophem et al., 2001; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002; Faems et al. 2005 among others).  
Less research addressed potential drawbacks of collaborative R&D. In a broader context, 
studies have shown that searching for external knowledge from a variety of sources is only 
attractive up to a certain point. Further expanding the search may result in “over-searching” 
(March 1991; Katila and Ahuja 2002; Laursen and Salter 2006, Grimpe and Kaiser 2010). 
Similar reasoning may hold for collaboration. Even though collaboration may positively 
influence innovation performance initially, engaging in additional collaborative projects is 
likely to exhibit diminishing or even negative returns (Deeds and Hill 1996). As long as the 
benefits from collaborating outweigh the costs, a firm’s innovation performance will increase 
with the number of collaborative projects. After a certain threshold, however, this may no 
longer be the case. The reason for this may be twofold: First, collaboration comes at the costs 
of coordination and monitoring (Rosenberg 1982; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). Second, 
collaboration comes at the cost of disclosure and the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the 
partners (Foray and Steinmüller 2003; Bader 2008; Bogers 2011). Just as gains from 
collaboration are potentially highest for firms with limited internal resources, such as small and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs), pains may be particularly high for those firms as well. Indeed, 
SMEs may predominantly benefit from collaboration through access to a broader and more 
diversified knowledge base because of their relative small size (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 
2014a). On the downside, SMEs tend also to be more resource constrained and required to 
budget managerial attention and available internal financial resources more carefully. 
Therefore, cost of coordination and transaction may be especially important for SMEs. 
Similarly, cost of disclosure may be higher for smaller than for larger firms in highly 
competitive markets in which information leakage quickly translates into a loss of market 
share. Consequently, the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation may not 
be linear, but follow an inverted-U shape.  
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The present study addresses the gains and pains from collaborative R&D empirically. Our 
analysis puts forward the preposition that the effect of collaboration depends on its intensity, 
that is, on the number R&D partnerships in total R&D projects. For a sample of 2,891 firms 
located in Germany, 86% of which are SMEs, we indeed find that increasing the share of 
collaborative projects in total projects is associated with a higher probability of product 
innovation and with a higher market success of new products. However, we find that this 
relationship turns negative for collaboration intensity higher than about 60% of all innovation 
projects. This result is robust to conditioning market success to the introduction of new 
products and to accounting for the selection into collaboration. Additionally, while many 
studies interested in external knowledge sourcing or collaborative behaviour of firms focus on 
particular industries, predominantly the pharmaceutical or semi-conductor sector, our study 
considers a sample that is more representative of the economy comprising high-, medium and 
low-tech manufacturing and services. 
The results of our study have implications at the management as well as the policy level. 
From a managerial perspective, it may seem rational to engage in collaborative R&D as 
opportunities for doing so open up. Overconfidence with regard to the expected returns from 
each of these relationships may lead to the engagement in more alliances than are actually 
beneficially. It thus seems advisable to balance the collaborative and non-collaborative 
projects. When evaluating potential benefits from additional collaborative projects, managers 
should consider the firm’s overall project portfolio before deciding on future collaboration 
strategies. From a policy view, encouraging collaborative R&D seems beneficial for innovation 
performance, which not only benefits the innovating firms, but also the economy as a whole. 
Policy makers may nonetheless consider that the initial rationale of encouraging collaboration 
to enhance firms’ competitiveness, and therefore customer surplus, may be undermined if used 
excessively. This seems particularly important in light of political encouragements to further 
fostering R&D partnerships through R&D subsidies or other policy tools.  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out or hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
identification strategy and section 4 presents the data. Section 5 elaborates on the results and 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. THE COLLABORATION – INNOVATION RELATIONSHIP  
2.1 Gains from collaboration 
There is a wide consensus in the economics and management literature that firms benefit from 
R&D collaborations. From a strategic management point of view, where collaboration and 
competition coexist, coordination, sharing of risks, resources and competencies and the 
building of new knowledge are key channels through which firms gain from collaborating in 
R&D (see for instance Caloghirou et al. 2003). In this context, the resource-based view 
suggests that in order to exploit existing resources (heterogeneous and immobile in nature) and 
in order to develop a long-term competitive advantage, firms need to also access external 
knowledge (Richardson, 1972). For instance, the more basic or more radical the R&D activity, 
the higher the potential need for a diversified portfolio of collaboration partners. The 
knowledge based view, which conceptualizes firms as mechanisms that enable knowledge 
creation, likewise asserts that R&D collaborations are a way to equip the firm with the 
knowledge it lacks internally to produce new or improved products (Un et al., 2010).   
There is indeed a whole series of empirical studies showing that collaborating firms perform 
better results than non-collaborating firms, especially in terms of innovation.1 Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1999), for instance, were among the first to find that a firm’s propensity to patent 
is significantly higher among R&D collaborators. Similarly, Van Ophem et al. (2001) find that 
firms participating in research partnerships file more patents than firms focusing on internal 
R&D. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) find similar results for firms in government-
sponsored research consortia in Japan. Czarnitzki and Fier (2003) and Czarnitzki et al. (2007) 
show that collaborating firms in Germany are more likely to patent than non-collaborating 
firms and Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) find a positive relationship between R&D 
partnerships and the size of firms’ patent portfolios. Vanhaverbeke et al. (2007) find a positive 
relationship between technology alliances and patent citations. Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 
(2014b) argue that the type of alliance may affect the ability and the incentives to patent, that 
is, patent quality and quantity, differently.  
While patenting activity may measure inventive activities, but not necessarily new 
products or commercial success of new products, innovation measures typically derived from 
                                                 
1 Previous studies differentiate between contractual agreements between partners (see e.g. Hagedoorn et al. (2000) 
and Caloghirou et al. (2003) for comprehensive overviews) or collaboration partner (see for instance Belderbos 
et al. 2004a; Faems et al. 2005; Knudsen 2007). 
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survey-data further suggest a positive relationship between R&D collaboration and successful 
project terminations, the introduction of new products, sales from product innovations as well 
as sales growth (Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2002; Lööf and Heshmati, 
2002; Janz et al., 2004; Belderbos et al. 2004a,b; Faems et al., 2005; Hoang and Rothaermel 
2010). In line with previous findings, we hypothesize that because of the inherent benefits of 
collaboration  
H1: Collaborative R&D projects are positivly associated with innovation performance. 
 
We expect this to hold in general, although we would assume that for SMEs the potential gains 
may be higher as their internal resource base is usually smaller and less diversified.   
 
2.2 Pains from collaboration  
Besides expected gains, however, there are also certain risks and caveats linked to R&D 
collaboration. Deeds and Hill (1996) were among the first to suggest that the collaboration-
innovation relationship may not be linear and their results for a sample of biotechnology firms 
indeed suggests diminishing and even decreasing returns on new product development for very 
high numbers of collaborations. The reasons for this observation may be several. 
First, transaction costs economics point to the costs of collaboration when contracts are 
incomplete. Incomplete contracts typically result from poor bargaining, directly related to the 
specificity of the assets at stake. The higher the degree of intangibility of an asset, the more 
difficult it becomes to formulate a complete contract (see Caloghirou et al. 2003 for a review). 
Since knowledge is a highly intangible asset (irrespective of whether it is tacit or explicit), it is 
generally very difficult to formulate complete contracts in the context of R&D collaborations. 
Hence, there is an inherent risk that R&D collaborations can become very costly if each party’s 
responsibility is not clearly specified in case of contingencies. Intuitively, this gets more 
important the higher the number of collaborative projects. Moreover, the more collaboration 
projects a firm engages in, the higher the likelihood that partners or projects of lower marginal 
value are among them. Previous research has shown that pursuit of self-interest at the expense 
of the partner as well as the important costs of deterring such opportunistic behavior can 
constitute a major cause of partnership instability (Williamson, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Deeds and 
Hill 1996).  
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In addition, firms may also find it difficult to assess the partner’s value ex-ante due to 
information asymmetries and secrecy prior to the collaboration. Selecting ideal cooperation 
partners determines the degree to which complementarities in assets and know-how may 
eventually be realized. The quality of ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring may decline as 
the number of alliances increases. Thus, every (additional) collaboration increases the burden 
on management, mainly through coordination effort including monitoring and transaction 
costs. Furthermore, coordination efforts for setting up a new collaborative project, especially 
when external parties are involved, constitute a drain on resources available for other projects 
which may affect the firms’ overall innovation performance. This may be even particularly 
severe when firms have a relatively high collaboration intensity and face resource constraints. 
In light of limited resources in SMEs, especially for R&D projects (Czarnitzki and 
Hottenrott 2011), we would expect these costs to matter even more for the latter than for larger 
firms. Indeed, data from a survey asking firms to indicate the main factors that prevent them 
from engaging into (new) collaborative projects supports this view. SMEs are significantly 
more likely to indicate that coordination cost are an important deterring factor than larger 
firms.2 
  Further, collaborative R&D naturally comes at the cost of disclosure. At least part of the 
knowledge has to be revealed to the consortium partners. Collaborating firms may transmit not 
only codified but also tacit knowledge to the partner so that this leakage risks to go beyond the 
joint project (Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014b). Indeed, partnerships bear the inherent risk 
of free-riding, where one associate tries to absorb a maximum of knowledge form the other 
while concealing its own efforts (see e.g. Shapiro and Willig 1990; Baumol 1993; Kesteloot 
and Veugelers 1995). For example, partnerships with substantial overlap in core businesses, 
geographic markets, and functional skills have a success rate of about 30% as competitors are 
inclined to maximize their own individual objectives rather than the partnership’s interests 
(Lokshin et al., 2011). In the same survey as mentioned earlier, indeed 60% of all firms declare 
to perceive leakage of information as a reason for not engaging in (additional) collaboration 
projects. Among already collaborating firms, this share is even higher with more than 70%. 
Finally, the extent to which a firm can learn from additional partners may diminish with 
the number of partners, while the outflow of their internal knowledge goes to an increasing 
                                                 
2 Based on a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reported that coordination costs constitute a very 
important reason not to enter a (new) R&D collaboration, the test statistic from a one-sided t-test on mean 
differences between SMEs and larger firms reports that coordination costs are significantly higher for SMEs than 
for large firms Pr(T < t) = 0.0384. As typically done in the literature, SMEs are defined as firms with less than 
250 employees. 
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number of external agents. This implies that the more collaborative projects a firm pursues, the 
lower the marginal gain, while coordination costs increase.  
 
Based on these arguments on the gains and pains from collaborating, we build our empirical 
model on the simple theory of a profit maximising firm that benefits from collaboration, but 
also takes into account transaction and disclosure costs when chosing the level of collaborative 
R&D projects. When engaging into collaborative R&D, the firm realizes marginal benefits 
from collaboration MB. The function MB’s first derivate is positive (MB’ > 0), but returns are 
decreasing as collaboration intensity increases (MB’’ < 0). While the marginal benefit function 
is assumed to be strictly concave, the firm’s collaboration cost function is expected to be 
linearly increasing or even convex. In other words, costs are increasing overproportianlly when 
collaboration intensity increases (C’ > 0 and C’’ > 0). In equilibrium the firm engages in 
collaboration projects only if expected benefits exceed expected cost. This yields a return 
function R that follows an inverse-U shape, that is R’> 0 and R’’< 0. This leads us to 
hypothesize that 
 
H2: The relationship between the share of collaborative projects in total innovation 
projects and innovation performance follows and inverted U-shape.   
  
Figure 1 illustrates the marginal benefit, the marginal cost and the net return curves 
graphically. While abstracting from inherent uncertainy in both these aspects, the firm’s 
optimal collaboration intensity will be given by the share of joint projects in total innovation 
project JP*. In a real world context characterized by information asymmetries, uncertainty and 
other managerial frictions, we expect that most firms may not chose the theoretically optimal 
collaboration intensity. In other words, we expect to see firms engage in a whole range of 
collaboration intensities below and above the turning point in our data. Thus, the purpose of 
the following empirial exercise is to identify the turing point JP.*  
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Figure 1: Optimal collaboration intensity  
 
 
3. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY  
Testing our hypotheses requires detailed information about a firm’s R&D activities as well as 
about its innovation performance. We first consider the event of introducing a new product to 
the market as innovation success. In a second step, we examine the market success of product 
innovations measured by the firm’s sales share from products that were new to the market. 
Third, we account for the conditionality of market success to the introduction of new products.  
 
For our first step, we specify innovation performance as discrete probability model which we 
estimate using a simple probit model. The sales share due to new products, however, is a 
percentage and hence requires estimation of a censored dependent variable model. For the 
second step, we therefore estimate Tobit models on new product sales written as: 
yi
* = X’ β + ɛ                                            (1) 
where yi is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent variable is equal to  
                       
*   
0    otherwis
 0
e
i
y if X
y
  
 

      (2) 
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and X represents a matrix of regressors, β the parameters to be estimated and ɛ the random error 
term. However, the standard Tobit model requires the assumption of homoscedasticity in order 
for the estimates to be consistent (see Wooldridge 2002: 533-535). After conducting tests on 
heteroscedasticity (Wald tests and LR tests) using a heteroscedastic specification of the Tobit 
model, we estimated the model by a maximum likelihood function in which we replace the 
homoscedastic standard error term σ with )'exp(  Zi  . In particular, we include five size 
class dummies based on the number of employees and six technology classes (following the 
OECD (2003) classification) to model group-wise multiplicative heteroscedasticity.  
 
Finally, we account for the conditionality of a positive sales share on having introduced a new 
product to the market. That is, the outcome variable yi is only observed if a selection criterion 
is met, i.e.  if zi > 0, with zi being the probability of the market introduction of a new product 
and yi the relative market success of new product(s). We estimate the impact of collaboration 
intensity on market success, conditional on a firm having introduced at least one new product 
as follows:  
                                                             
'
1     0
                 0 
i i i
i
i
X u if z
y
if z
  
 
 
  (3) 
with                                      2i i iz w u      and     
1
2
~ (0, )
~ (0,1)
u N
u N

 (4) 
and
1 2( , )corr u u  . This approach allows taking the error term correlation into account (see 
Heckman 1976, 1979). Indeed, if ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to (3) would 
yield biased results; upwards biased in case of positive error term correlation and downward 
biased in case of negative error term correlation. The model proposed by Heckman accounts 
for such error term correlation by restoring the zero conditional mean through including an 
estimate of the selection bias. This procedure further allows taking the censoring of our second 
stage outcome variable into account, that is, the truncated nature of the sales share from new 
products.  
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
The following analysis makes use of the 2012 wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 
covering the period 2009-2011. The MIP started in 1993 with the aim to provide representative 
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innovation data for policy and research purposes. It is the German part of the European-wide 
Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) and thus provides internationally comparable data. The 
sample population is representative for all firms with at least five employees in the German 
business sector. The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), infas Institut für 
Sozialforschung and ISI Fraunhofer Institute conduct this survey on behalf of the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research. For a detailed description of the survey see Peters 
(2008). The present study focuses on information of 2,891 firms in manufacturing and business 
related industries that had at least ten employees in 20093 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for 
the sample distribution across industries). 
 
Innovation performance measures 
The binary indicator (new product) takes the value one if a firm indicated to have introduced 
at least one new product to the market (zero otherwise). This variable serves as outcome 
variable in the Probit model and in the first stage of our selection model. To measure market 
success, firms indicated the share in sales from these new products (new product sales). Since 
only firms with new products can have positive sales, this variable serves as outcome variable 
in the Tobit model and in the second stage of the selection model. 
   
Innovation projects and collaboration measure 
Firms indicated the total number of innovation projects (# all projects) as well as the number 
of innovation projects in collaboration with external partners (# joint projects) during the period 
2009-2011. From that information, we can calculate collaboration intensity as: 
 
# joint projects
collaboration intensity 
#  all projects
   
 To capture non-linarites in the relationship between collaboration intensity and innovation, we 
include the squared values for collaboration intensity in addition to the original variable in all 
models. 
 
Controls 
Both the likelihood to introduce a new product as well as its share of total sales may depend 
on firm size. We therefore include the firm’s size measured by the number of employees (firm 
                                                 
3 We drop all firms that classify as micro firm according to the European Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 from the sample.    
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size) in both stages of the model. Moreover, the relationship may not be linear so that we 
include also the squared value of firm size. Due to the skewness of the firm size distribution, 
these variables enter in logarithms. Since R&D is the most important input in the innovation 
production equation, we control for the firms R&D intensity (R&D intensity) measured by 
R&D expenditures divided by sales. To capture different exposure to international product 
market pressure, which affects both pressure to innovate as well as the potential market size 
for the new product, we also include the firms export intensity (Export intensity). We further 
account for the firm’s ownership structure by including a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if the firm has a part of an enterprise group. Finally, we include a set of 25 industry dummies 
that capture differences in technological opportunities between sectors (see Table A1 in the 
appendix for details). 
Finally, for identification reasons, we need at least one independent variable that appears in the 
selection equation but does not appear in the outcome equation i.e. we need a variable that 
affects the probability of introducing a new product, but not the share of novelty sales in total 
sales (Sartori 2003, 112). In our case, the firms’ product portfolio diversification serves as 
exclusion restriction that meets this condition. More precisely, firms indicated the share in sales 
that can be attributed to the single biggest product (diversification). The larger that value, the 
more concentrated a firm’s product portfolio and the smaller the more diverse it is. The variable 
enters the first stage significantly, since a more concentrated product portfolio affects the 
likelihood for new products negatively. Once firm decided to launch market novelties, the 
market success of the latter should not be impacted by the diversification of the overall product 
portfolio.  
 
Timing of variables 
Our data structure is cross-sectional. That is, we observe both collaboration projects and 
innovation performance during the same period (2009-2011). The advantage of this 
measurement is that it accounts for the fact that collaborative projects usually last longer than 
a single year. The drawback is that we consider only short-run effects of these projects on 
innovation performance. Likewise, our control variables refer to this period.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the main variables, displaying the means, medians, 
maximums and minimums of the variables that we use in the subsequent regression models. 
About 15% of the firms in the sample have introduced a new product to the market and the 
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average sales shares from these new products is 13%. On average, a firm in our sample had 6.3 
innovation projects during the sample period 2009 to 2011 of which 1.8 were collaborative. 
This results in an average collaboration intensity of 0.17. Among collaborators, the 
collaboration intensity is naturally much higher with about 0.53. About 20% of the firms had 
more than one collaborative project and about 3% had more than ten. Collaboration intensity 
thus ranges from zero to one. Roughly eleven percent of the firms undertake more than 60 
percent of their projects in collaboration and close to 9% even conduct all their innovation 
projects in collaboration. On average, a firm in our sample has 240 employees. This high 
average firm size in our sample does not reveal that more than 86% of the firms have 250 or 
less employees, i.e. are SMEs. The median firm size with 42 employees provides a more 
accurate picture. Firms have an R&D intensity of 3.5%, and an export intensity of 15%, on 
average. Finally, about 31% of the firms are part of an enterprise group. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
    Full Sample, N=2891 
 Variables Unit  Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
new product  dummy 0.148 0.355 0 0 1 
% new product sales§ ratio  0.127 0.159 0.800 0 1 
             
# all projects count 6.251 43.023 0 0 1500 
# joint projects count 1.778 12.892 0 0 500 
collaboration intensity ratio  0.167 0.32 0 0 1 
# employees count 239.77 1266.38 42 10 38.384 
R&D intensity ratio  0.035 0.331 0 0 12.757 
export intensity ratio 0.154 0.251 0.001 0 1 
group dummy 0.314 0.464 0 0 1 
SMEs dummy 0.861 0.346 1.000 0 1 
§The percentage of products new to the market is conditional on having at least one product innovation that is  
new to the market.  
 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of the probit and tobit estimations for both, the full sample and for 
SMEs only. The main variables of interest, namely collaboration intensity and its squared 
value, allow drawing conclusions with regard to our hypotheses. First, collaboration intensity 
enters positive and significant in both first and second stage confirming H1. Second, the 
squared value enters negative and significant suggesting an inverted U-shape relationship 
between collaboration intensity and both the likelihood to introduce a new product to the 
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market (Model 1) as well as for the sales share from new products, i.e. market success of new 
products (Model 2). When we calculate the curve’s turning point, we find the extreme value 
(maximum) to be at around 0.61-0.62 for both outcome variables. Thus, a share of collaborative 
projects in all innovation projects larger than 62% may be detrimental for innovation 
performance, while lower collaboration intensities are beneficial.  
Lind and Mehlum (2010) argue, however, that coefficient signs and significance (in addition 
to checking whether the extreme value is within the variable’s range) is not sufficient to support 
(inverted) U relationships. While very common in the literature, problems with this type of 
inference arise when the true relationship is concave (or convex) but monotone over relevant 
data values. Therefore, we perform the “appropriate U-test” that the authors suggest to test for 
the slope of the curve at several points, as the commonly reported criteria may be misleading 
if the estimated extremum is too close to the end point of the data range. In our case, the 
estimated maximum at about 62% is well within the data range (see Figure 2). Accordingly, 
the t-test statistics derived from the probit and heteroscedastic tobit models clearly support our 
second hypotheses of an inverted U-relationship (see Lind and Mehlum 2010 for the technical 
details).  
As we can see from Models 3 and 4 in Table 2, the results for the full sample are not biased by 
the inclusion of large firms as similar conclusions can be drawn in the subsample of small and 
medium sized firms. The similarity of the results thus indicate the results are mainly driven by 
the SMEs in our sample. Performing the analysis on (the limited number of) large firms only, 
does not yield significant coefficient estimates. Finally, all control variables have the expected 
signs and industry dummies are jointly significant.  
Table 3 presents the results from the selection models as outlined in section 3. Columns one 
and  three show the results from the first stage, that is, the probability to have a new product 
and columns two to four display the second stage results. We see that the mills ratio is highly 
significant underlining the appropriateness of the Heckman selection procedure. In addition to 
the full sample results, we again show results for the sub-sample of small and medium-sized 
firms (SMEs). Compared to the results presented in Table 2, we see that the second stage effects 
are indeed slightly smaller for the full sample, but still show the same pattern and statistical 
significance. The maximum is still around 62% collaborative projects underlining the 
robustness of this result.    
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Table 2: Probit and heteroscedastic-robust tobit estimations 
 Full sample (2,891 obs.) SMEs (2,489 obs.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
 Pr(new product = 1) new product sales % Pr(new product = 1) new product sales % 
Variable   ∂y/∂x s.e.     Coef. s.e.         ∂y/∂x s.e.      Coef. s.e.   
collaboration 
intensity  
0.703 0.039 *** 0.910 0.093 *** 0.549 0.027 *** 1.008 0.121 *** 
collaboration 
intensity2  
-0.578 0.040 *** -0.736 0.074 *** -0.443 0.031 *** -0.811 0.095 *** 
ln(size) -0.048 0.021 ** 0.016 0.040  -0.017 0.048  0.150 0.166  
ln(size)2 0.007 0.002 *** 0.002 0.003  0.003 0.006  -0.015 0.020  
R&D intensity 0.012 0.015  0.054 0.043  0.007 0.011  0.052 0.043  
export 
intensity 
0.038 0.019 * 0.047 0.039  0.026 0.017  0.053 0.048  
group 0.005 0.010  0.009 0.014  0.001 0.008  0.009 0.016  
Extremum 
point  
0.608 0.618 0.620 0.621 
Log likelihood -790.416 -400.293 -614.13 -338.798 
Lind-Mehlum 
Appropriate U 
t-test 
9.54***  7.38*** 8.50*** 6.76***  
Joint 
significance of 
industries 
7028.01*** 8828.73*** 2957.74*** 7.0e+08*** 
Notes: Industry dummies included, not presented. *(**,***) indicate 10% (5%, 1%) significance.  
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Table 3: Heckman section models (two step estimation)               
 Full sample (2,891 obs.) SMEs (2,489 obs.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Pr(new product = 1) new product sales % Pr(new product = 1) new product sales % 
Variable    Coef.    s.e.     Coef.          s.e.    Coef.     s.e.                  Coef.       s.e.  
collaboration intensity  5.275 0.366 *** 0.605 0.297 ** 5.361 0.411 *** 1.064 0.500 ** 
(collaboration intensity)2  -4.337 0.370 *** -0.493 0.245 ** -4.322 0.412 *** -0.854 -0.854 ** 
ln(size) -0.362 0.139 *** -0.087 0.029 *** -0.166 0.427  -0.219 0.126 * 
ln(size)2 0.052 0.014 *** 0.008 0.003 *** 0.027 0.055  0.025 0.016  
R&D intensity 0.089 0.069  0.141 0.020 *** 0.071 0.070  0.137 0.025 *** 
Export intensity 0.282 0.149 * 0.103 0.036 *** 0.251 0.172  0.138 0.053 *** 
group 0.041 0.088  0.006 0.020  0.010 0.098  0.003 0.028  
exclusion restriction: 
diversification -0.005 0.001 ***    -0.01 0.002 ***    
constant -0.823 0.577   -0.109 0.221   -1.150 0.940   -0.078 0.379   
Extremum point  0.608 0.614 0.620 0.623 
Lind-Mehlum Appropriate U 
t-test§ 2.92*** 2.77*** 
Joint significance of 
industries  94.62*** 29.55 170.31*** 15.17 
Mills ratio (lambda) 0.165** 0.270** 
Number of censored 
observations 2,463 2,181 
Notes: Industry dummies included, not presented. * (**,***) indicate 10% (5%, 1%) significance. §based on linear regression model on new product sales (2nd stage).  
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Figure 2: new product sales and collaboration intensity 
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
A concern that could be raised is the potential endogeneity of choosing to collaborate. Some 
unobserved characteristics that influence the probability to engage into collaboration could also 
influence the sales share in market novelties once the collaboration strategy is chosen. It could 
well be that more innovative firms are more likely chose to engage into R&D collaboration. In 
this case, collaboration intensity would be endogenous in a regression of market novelty sales 
on R&D collaboration. In order to account for this, we estimate an endogenous switching 
model by full information maximum likelihood method (FIML), by modeling the behavior of 
firms based on two regression equations and a criterion function 𝐼𝑖, that determines the 
collaboration status of a firm i: 
𝐼𝑖 = 1       𝑖𝑓         𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 > 0 
𝐼𝑖 = 0       𝑖𝑓         𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ≤ 0 
 
            𝑦1𝑖 =  𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖          𝑖𝑓      𝐼𝑖 = 1    (5) 
𝑦2𝑖 =  𝛽2𝑥2𝑖 + 𝜀2𝑖        𝑖𝑓        𝐼𝑖 = 0    (6) 
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with 𝑦𝑗𝑖 being the dependent variables in the continuous equations; 𝑥1𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2𝑖  a vector of 
control variables (the same as in the previous equation) and 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛾 a vector of parameters. 
The correlation coefficient between ε1 and ui is 
2
1 11 2 / u    and the one between ε2i and ui 
is 2
1 22 3 / u    . In line with our Heckman equation, the selection equation includes an 
additional variable to improve identification. 
If 𝐼𝑖 = 1, firmi chooses to collaborate and the sales in market novelties is determined by 
equation (5); otherwise, it is determined by equation (6). The first step of this model isolates 
the exogenous determinates of engaging into an R&D collaboration like firm size, ownership 
structure and R&D intensity, as well as an endogenous factor, namely the diversification of a 
firm’s product portfolio likely to influence the choice of either one collaboration strategy.. We 
employ the share in sales that can be attributed to the single biggest product (diversification) 
as exclusion restriction. Similar to the logic in the selection models, we argue here that the 
larger the value of diversification the more concentrated product portfolio which affects the 
collaboration likelihood negatively. A more diversified product portfolio on the other hand may 
provide more opportunities to engage in collaborative agreements. The market success of new 
products should, however, not be influenced. The second step, the outcome equation, then 
provides consistent estimates on market novelty sales while accounting for this endogenous 
selection 
As can be gathered from Table 4, accounting for the selection into entering a collaboration does 
not fundamentally change our conclusions. We do however see that the correlation coefficients 
are significant. We further find that the estimated coefficients of collaboration intensity are 
smaller if the selection into collaboration is taken into account and that the extremum point has 
slightly moved to the left. In particular, we find it at 54% for the full sample and at 58% for 
SMEs. 
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Table 4: Endogenous switching model                               
 Full sample (2,891 obs.) SMEs (2,489 obs.) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Stage 1  Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
 Pr(collaboration = 1) 
new product sales if 
collaboration = = 0 
new product sales if 
collaboration == 1 Pr(collaboration = 1) 
new product sales if 
collaboration = = 0 
new product sales if 
collaboration == 1 
Variable Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.    
collaboration intensity        0.113 0.057 **       0.190 0.065 *** 
(collaboration 
intensity)2        -0.103 0.049 **       -0.162 0.057 *** 
ln(size) -0.082 0.146  -0.003 0.003  -0.054 0.015 *** -0.328 0.348  -0.002 0.004  -0.093 0.060  
ln(size)2 0.027 0.014 ** 0.000 0.000  0.004 0.001 *** 0.061 0.043  0.000 0.001  0.008 0.007  
R&D intensity 3.778 1.864 ** 0.518 0.017 *** 0.010 0.016  3.075 1.252 ** 0.388 0.106 *** 0.008 0.016  
Export intensity 0.999 0.183 *** -0.004 0.006  0.016 0.026  0.775 0.260 *** -0.011 0.005 ** 0.014 0.034  
group 0.149 0.065 ** 0.002 0.002  -0.006 0.010  0.044 0.066  0.000 0.002  0.002 0.009  
Exclusion restriction: 
diversification -0.005 0.001 ***       -0.004 0.003        
constant -1.529 0.377 *** 0.007 0.007   0.283 0.086 ** -0.788 0.642   0.007 0.008   0.348 0.165 ** 
sigma0 0.031 0.007 ***       0.028 0.005 ***       
sigma1 0.120 0.014 ***       0.134 0.016 ***       
rho0 0.004 0.007        -0.697 0.251 ***       
rho1 -0.491 0.139 ***       -0.548 0.127 ***       
Extremum point          0.549         0.585 
Joint significance of 
industries  
6.3e+10*** 4.8e+10*** 7.4e+9*** 3.1e+06*** 1.8e+08*** 1.2e+08*** 
Wald test of 
independence of 
equations 
Chi2(2) = 10.30*** Chi2(2)=14.41*** 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides an empirical analysis to test theoretical considerations suggesting that 
firms can benefit from collaborative innovation projects, but only up to a certain point. It has 
long been shown in the literature that a firm’s innovation success not only depends on internal 
resources, but also on knowledge it can gather from outside of the firm’s boundaries. While 
the literature has provided ample evidence of the advantages of pooling knowledge and 
resources through R&D alliances, the literature pointing out that there may be too much of a 
good thing after a certain threshold is still scarce. To deepen our understanding of the benefits 
and the costs of such alliances, the present study aims at filling this gap by providing evidence 
that the intensity with which a firm seeks for external knowledge through partnership matters. 
In particular, using data of a sample of German firms from the Mannheim Innovation Panel, 
we show that more is not necessarily better. Indeed, we find that for high levels of collaboration 
intensity, the initially positive association between new product sales and collaboration 
intensity turns negative. In particular, we find the curve to turn for collaboration intensities 
larger than about 0.6. The mean collaboration intensity in the sample of collaborating firms is 
about 0.6 and the median is 0.5. That is, about half of the firms of our sample may have 
collaboration intensities that are beyond what is actually beneficial in terms of innovation 
performance. Thus, while collaboration may help firms to innovate, transaction cost such as 
coordination efforts and monitoring as well as the cost of disclosure, may countervail the 
benefits a firm can get from engaging into R&D partnerships.  
The challenge that innovation managers and entrepreneurs face is to determine the right 
collaboration intensity of their firms. Our results certainly do not suggest that a share of 
collaborative projects larger than 60 percent is too high for every firm. They do however 
challenge the maybe too optimistic view of openness as a key component for creating 
inventions and innovative products, thereby provoking thoughts in those firms with high 
collaboration intensities. It seems worthwhile to continuously balance gains against costs and 
adjusting collaboration strategies accordingly. The results presented here were derived from a 
sample of mostly SMEs. It may well be that the conclusions are SME-specific, pointing to the 
trade-off that these firms face when balancing gains and pains from collaboration and which 
are likely to differ for larger firms. 
From a policy point of view, our findings point to the fact that R&D collaborations are not 
necessarily welfare enhancing through more innovation per se. Exempting R&D collaborations 
from anti-trust laws intends to raise EU firms’ competitiveness. While our results do not 
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undermine that collaboration may be a way to achieving this goal, they also depict that this 
goal may only be achieved if the strategy is used wisely and with a certain moderation by 
participating firms. If collaboration costs start outweighing their benefits, the competitiveness 
of the firms, and, as a consequence the welfare of consumers, will be impacted negatively. 
The present study has some obvious limitations that call for future research that can address 
these. First, the collaboration measure used here is rather broad and does not take into account 
heterogeneity in alliances types and partners. Different types of collaboration or location of the 
partners may indeed have different levels of costs and gains attributed to them, which may lead 
to different calibration of the number of external partners that are beneficial to the firm 
(Giarratana and Mariani, 2014). Equally important, the cross-sectional nature of our data does 
not allow taking into account the dynamics between collaboration and innovation that occur as 
firms repeatedly engage in collaborative projects. Sampson (2005), for instance, stresses that 
alliance experience matters for returns from collaboration to materialize. It would thus be 
interesting to see if costs and benefits to collaboration change as firms become more alliance 
experienced. Alliance experience could be valuable both in general and with a specific partner 
as trust has been found to predict the successful acquisition of tacit knowledge which may be 
important for radical innovations (Sherwood and Covin 2008). 
We further suggest future research to study much closer how firms manage their alliance 
portfolios and how certain types of collaboration (intensities) benefit at the research and/or 
development stage of an R&D project. Moreover, we may not capture all benefits and costs, 
especially when these only occur in the long run. Finally, it would be interesting to see if the 
turning points identified in our paper would change significantly in a sample dominated by 
larger firms.     
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Appendices 
Table A1: Distribution of firms across industries 
 
Industry   Freq. Percent Cum. 
Mining  49 1.69 1.69 
Food/tobacco 127 4.39 6.09 
Textiles  96 3.32 9.41 
Paper/wood/print 189 6.54 15.95 
Chemical  105 3.63 19.58 
Plastics/rubber 80 2.77 22.35 
Glass/ceramics 67 2.32 24.66 
Metal  224 7.75 32.41 
Machinery 195 6.75 39.16 
Electrical engineering 145 5.02 44.17 
Medicine/optic/processing 123 4.25 48.43 
Vehicles  80 2.77 51.19 
Furniture  72 2.49 53.68 
Energy/water/construction 179 4.39 58.08 
Wholesale 105 3.63 63.51 
Retail  33 1.14 64.65 
Transport/post 212 7.33 71.98 
Bank/insurance  66 2.28 74.26 
IT/telecommunication 112 3.87 78.14 
Technical services 187 6.47 84.61 
Business related services 124 4.29 88.9 
Other services  259 8.96 97.86 
Real estate  27 0.93 98.79 
Media   35 1.21 100 
Total  2,891 100  
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Table A2: Cross-Correlations (2,891 obs.)          
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 # all projects 1          
2 # joint projects 0.6386* 1         
3 collaboration intensity 0.0532* 0.1832* 1        
4 collaboration (dummy) 0.2166* 0.2211* 0.8360* 1       
5 # employees 0.5091* 0.2695* 0.0155 0.1273* 1      
6 R&D intensity 0.0328 0.0619* 0.1516* 0.1523* -0.0089 1     
7 export intensity 0.1780* 0.1182* 0.2435* 0.3844* 0.1426* 0.0293 1    
8 group 0.1236* 0.0699* 0.0807* 0.1907* 0.1920* -0.0168 0.2665* 1   
9 diversification -0.0498* -0.0142 -0.1048* -0.1591* -0.0799* 0.0126 -0.0951* -0.0549* 1  
10 % new product sales 0.1107* 0.2110* 0.2562* 0.3105* 0.0826* 0.1892* 0.1710* 0.0458 -0.0353 1 
11 new product 0.2048* 0.1936* 0.3743* 0.5337* 0.1601* 0.1008* 0.2848* 0.1422* -0.1336* 0.5941* 
Note: * indicates a 1% significance level. 
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